Introduction
Lebanon is a religiously heterogeneous society. Its religious composition has changed in the course of the last few decades due to immigration, the conflicts and socio-economic circumstances that led to the emigration of thousands of Lebanese. Moreover, no particular religious group dominates the country; the different religious sects, therefore, are competing with each other for seizing political power in the context of a widely divided society. The political system itself is a mix of sectarianism and confessionalism which were informally implanted by the ‘National Pact’ of 1943 and institutionalised by the ‘Taif Agreement’ of 1989 which ended the Lebanese Civil War.
Lebanon has experienced a number of internal conflicts and civil wars since its independence. During these conflicts, foreign powers played a crucial role in their outcome by either supporting or controlling the various Lebanese factions, or by using their own forces. Lebanon is a classic case of fighting by proxy; regional and/or global powers use the ethno-religious diversity of that country in order to serve their own political ends. In this study, I will try to demonstrate this by analysing conditions on the ground; I will more particularly, turn my attention to the case of the first internal conflict in Lebanon, the 1958 Lebanon Crisis, which I believe test the accuracy of my hypothesis.
The Middle East in the 1950’s
During the Cold War, the USA and the USSR had an active presence in the Middle East[1]. The Egyptian Revolution of 1952 that brought Gamal Abdel Nasser to power, created two de facto rival factions in the Arab World; one pro-Western, one pro-Soviet[2]. The first included the Arab monarchies and was led by Saudi Arabia, representing traditionalism, rentierism, Islamism (in some cases) and of course monarchy. Apart from this Arab coalition, the USA and their allies had also maintained strong ties with other pro-Western states in the region and, more specifically, with Israel, Iran and, of course, with Turkey which was a NATO member-state since 1952. The second faction was a revisionist coalition led by Egypt, supporting secularism, anti-imperialism, pan-Arab nationalism and socialism. Modelled on the Egyptian Revolution and Nasserism, a number of coups took place in an effort to overthrow the monarchies in various Arab States. As a result, some monarchies were replaced by various nationalist-socialist regimes (e.g. in Iraq[3], Yemen[4] and Libya[5]). In other instances, nationalists came to power replacing republican regimes, e.g. in Syria.
In 1955, a defensive organisation, known as the Baghdad Pact, was formed to prevent communist incursions and foster peace in the Middle East. It was founded by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and the United Kingdom and was renamed the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), in 1959 after Iraq pulled out of the Pact[6]. Reacting to this, Egypt and Syria coalesced into the United Arab Republic in 1958[7]. Thus, even though almost all the Arab States were part of the Non-Aligned Movement, the US backed the Saudi-led monarchies, while the Soviets supported the Nasserist and, later, the Baathist republics[8].
The Cold War in Lebanon
In these geopolitical circumstances, the two dominant religious groups of Lebanon, Maronite Christians and Muslims, were part of the conflict of the two coalitions in the late 1950s. After World War II, at the time of the founding of the Lebanese Republic, the initial refusal of the French to withdraw their forces was problematic. But gaining independence was only one of Lebanon’s political problems. The country’s population was divided nearly 50/50 between various Christian sects (the most significant being Maronite Christians) and Muslims. The Muslim community was itself split between Sunnis and Shias, with a substantial Druze minority[9]. On the one hand, Muslims were generally sympathetic to union with Syria and on the other Christians supported a Western-affiliated Lebanon. An unwritten grand political compromise, called the ‘National Pact’, was agreed between Christian leaders and Muslims in 1943. This provided for a permanent division of political power between Christians, who received the Presidency in perpetuity, and Muslims who were guaranteed the office of Prime Minister. A ratio of six Christian to five Muslim members of parliament was also foreseen. According to this understanding, Christians compromised by accepting that Lebanon would be an Arab State and Muslims on their part abandoned their aspirations to unite with Syria[10]. In a few words, Lebanon’s foreign policy was seen as neutral. In the next few years, the two sides respected the Pact regarding the confessional political system. However, they continued to indirectly promote their strategic aspirations regarding Lebanon’s role and final alignment in the region.
The 1958 Lebanon Crisis
Nevertheless, in the late 1950s, the first major crisis occurred. The decision of the pro-Western Maronite President Camille Chamoun, not to break diplomatic relations with the Western powers that attacked Egypt during the Suez Crisis, escalated tensions between Egypt and Lebanon in 1956[11]. The following year, the Lebanese government accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine[12] and allowed the Sixth Fleet to stand by in Beirut while King Hussein successfully faced a coup attempt in Jordan[13]. Tensions were further heightened when Chamoun strengthened his relations with the pro-Western Baghdad Pact which, according to Nasser, posed a threat to pan-Arab nationalism[14]. To the Sunni Muslims, acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine was a distinct breach of the National Pact[15], implying that the Christians were calling upon the United States to replace France as their traditional protector and to intervene in Lebanon on their behalf[16]. Chamoun’s opponents believed, in addition, that by aligning Lebanon with the West against Egypt and Syria, the President, not only violated Beirut’s traditional neutrality, but also upset the delicate balance between the various Lebanese factions. Moreover, they felt that the President wanted to ally Lebanon with the pro-Western Arab States in order to enhance the US position in the region and further open the country to Western ‘capitalist interests’[17].
In 1958, the establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR) deepened the crisis. Many Sunni and other opposition figures supported Nasser’s attempt to unify the Arab States[18], while the President initially refused to recognise the new entity[19]. Therefore, Lebanese Muslims pressed the government to join the newly created United Arab Republic[20], while Christians, especially Maronites, wanted to keep Lebanon aligned to the West. In fact, the majority of the Christian community saw Nasser’s pan-Arab nationalist rhetoric and the trend of Muslim opinion toward Arab unity, as a threat to Lebanon’s independence, and consequently, a threat to the non-Muslim minorities. Without Western support Christians might be left isolated during a major crisis[21].The only guarantee of the Maronite community’s security was the continuation of the status quo.
In this context of conflicting interests, an uprising began in the country[22]. Each side accused the other of violating the National Pact. Chamoun’s failure to break relations with Great Britain and France in 1956[23] angered the Lebanese Muslims including Prime Minister Rashid Karami[24]. Chamoun’s supporters saw in the enthusiastic support that Muslim politicians had for Egypt an invitation to abandon Lebanon’s neutral foreign policy[25]. Nevertheless, the balance of power was clearly not in President Chamoun’s favour, given that General Fuad Chehab refused to commit the army on the president’s side[26]. The general was opposed to the idea of allowing the army to interfere in internal struggles[27].
The neutral stance of the military had a serious impact in the development of the crisis – for two reasons: firstly, it exposed a basic division within the government and the Maronite Christian community thus creating a legitimacy deficit for Chamoun. Secondly, the army’s neutrality enabled the armed Opposition with political and material aid from the UAR, to expand its presence in large areas of the country[28]. Chamoun was forced to rely on local militias like the Phalange militias[29] and the police force for resistance. To defeat his opponents and their regional sponsors, he required the intervention of a superior Western force[30]. To impress the US, he tried to emphasise the international aspect of the crisis and to portray the conflict as a struggle between pro-Western Lebanon and radical Arab nationalism, which was allied with communism[31]. Thus, President Chamoun tried to internationalise the dispute in order to draw the United States on his side. In contrast, Opposition figures were strongly against the internationalisation of the crisis, given that the strength of internal forces was in their favour[32]. They declared that the nature of the conflict was internal and had nothing to do with the UAR. Nevertheless, they relied heavily on moral and material support from the UAR[33].
In May, the assassination of a Maronite editor of an opposition, left-wing and pan-Arabist newspaper sparked a new uprising which was followed by nation-wide demonstrations and a general strike. What were at first just individual incidents later flared into violent clashes between the government and the Opposition, until each side had seized whole areas of the country, thus igniting an open Lebanese civil war[34]. Armed groups, opposed to the government, soon had the upper hand as a result of military supplies they received from Syria. Moreover, the Lebanese army’s decision to remain neutral favoured them. The opposition included several non-Muslims also who, although non-Arab nationalists, supported the struggle against Chamoun for their own political reasons[35]. By July, the struggle had become truly partisan and threatened to throw Lebanon completely into the Nasser camp. The danger of a smashing victory for the UAR appeared imminent and the rebels managed to control three-quarters of Lebanese territory[36]. The Lebanese Government was ready to formally request Western armed support[37].
Everything changed on 14 July 1958. A coup in Iraq led to the destruction of the pro-Western regime in that country. Panicked, Washington decided that the Lebanese President was entitled to US military aid under the terms of the Eisenhower Doctrine[38] and Chamoun made the relative formal request[39]. Eventually, US Marines landed in Beirut[40] and took control of the port and of the international airport. The arrival of American forces in Lebanon did not put an end to the uprising in the country; in the weeks that followed, the Muslim rebellion, cut off from the outside world, lost much of its pan-Arab character and began to appear more as an internal movement[41]. In the next few weeks, all factions tried to compromise on a candidate for the presidency. On 31 July, the Lebanese Parliament elected General Fuad Chehab as the new president[42]. This particular crisis was over.
Conclusion
Consequently, the Crisis of 1958 proved that local actors played a decisive role in the development of events and were far from passive or simply foreign driven actors; and this, despite the admittedly great dependence on outside factors. The division of world politics into two competing blocs was often used by small states in advancing their interest profiting from the antagonism of East and West, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In the case of Lebanon, Camille Chamoun and his adversaries tried to entice both sides of the world divide to intervene in their favour. As many others elsewhere in the planet, they tried to lure the support of the Great Powers to meet their own political ends. In doing so, however, minor actors became themselves the proxies of the superpowers and, in turn, were used by them. The result was that the Middle East became a major theatre of the Cold War not only because it was so decided by the two major world rivals, but also as a result of the local antagonisms that drew them into the conflict.
* George Meneshian is a member of the Middle East Research Group of the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies – Institute of International Relations, Athens, Greece.
[1] John C. Campbell, ‘The Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East.’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 401, 1972, pp. 126-136. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1039119. Accessed: 28 April 2019.
[2] Avi Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace, Vintage Books, 2009, pp. 153 – 159.
[3] C. Hunt, The history of Iraq, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 2005, p. 76.
[4] Saeed M. Badeeb, The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict Over North Yemen, 1962-1970, New York, Routledge, 2019, Chapter 3.
[5] Jennifer Latson, ‘Gaddafi Before the Gold-Plated Guns’, Time, 2 September 2014, https://time.com/3207127/gaddafi-1969/. Accessed: 28 April 2019.
[6] ‘The Baghdad Pact (1955) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)’, US Department of State Archive, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/98683.htm. Accessed: 9 May 2020.
[7] James P. Jankowski, Nasser’s Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, pp. 101-115.
[8] Campbell, op. cit. pp. 132-133.
[9] T. G. Fraser, The Makers of the Modern Middle East, 2nd edn., London, Gingko Library, 2015, p. 331.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Douglas Little, ‘His Finest Hour? Eisenhower, Lebanon, and the 1958 Middle East Crisis.’, Diplomatic History, vol. 20, no. 1, winter 1996, p. 34. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24913444. Accessed: 8 May 2019.
[12] Peter L. Hahn, ‘Securing the Middle East: The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957’, Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 1, March 2006, p. 40. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/27552745. Accessed: 8 May 2019.
[13] Miriam Joyce, Anglo-American Support for Jordan: The Career of King Hussein, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 19-20.
[14] Spenser C. Tucker (ed.), The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Political, Social, and Military History, Volume I: A-F, California, ABC-CLIO, 2008, p. 186.
[15] Little, op. cit. p. 35.
[16] Karol R. Sorby, ‘Lebanon: The Crisis of 1958’, Asian and African Studies, vol. 9, no. 1, 2000, p. 82, https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/082713259_Sorby.pdf.
[17] Ibid. 89.
[18] Spencer C. Tucker (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts, Volume II: E-L, ABC-CLIO, 2010, p. 734.
[19] M. S. Agwani, The Lebanese Crisis, 1958: A Documentary Study, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1965, pp. 3-4.
[20] Sorby, op. cit. p. 88.
[21] Ibid. p. 92.
[22] Don Peretz, The Middle East Today, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963, p. 339.
[23] In 1956, Israel, the UK and France invaded Egypt in order to take control of the Suez Canal and topple G. A. Nasser, thus igniting the Suez Crisis.
[24] Spencer C. Tucker (ed.), Middle East Conflicts from Ancient Egypt to the 21st Century: An Encyclopedia and Document Collection, Volume II: G-N, ABC-CLIO, 2019, p. 749.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Peretz, op. cit. p. 339.
[27] Sami E. Baroudi, ‘Divergent Perspectives among Lebanon’s Maronites during the 1958 Crisis’, Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 15, no. 1, p. 17.
[28] Sorby, op. cit. p. 93.
[29] John C. Rolland (ed.), Lebanon: Current Issues and Background, New York, Nova Science Publishers, 2003, p. 138.
[30] Sorby, op. cit. p. 93.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid. p. 94.
[34] Irene L. Gendzier, Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, Columbia University Press, 2006, pp. 242-246.
[35] Baroudi, op. cit. p. 24.
[36] Fawwaz Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon, London, Pluto Press, 2012, p. 134.
[37] Kamal S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968, p. 202.
[38] Bruce Riedel, ‘1958: When America first went to war in the Middle East’, Brookings, 2 July 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/02/1958-when-america-first-went-to-war-in-the-middle-east/. Accessed: 8 May 2020.
[39] William Harris, Lebanon: A History, 600 – 2011, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 212.
[40] Hahn, op. cit. p. 44.
[41] Sorby, op. cit. p. 106.
[42] Little, op. cit. p. 52.
