Reports indicate that Saudi Arabia is considering the possibility of direct involvement in the war against Iran, signaling a potential shift in its strategic posture.
Initially, the Saudi kingdom adopted a cautious and deterrence-oriented approach toward a possible military confrontation with Iran. Senior officials sought to prevent escalation by exerting pressure on the American leadership, urging restraint and discouraging the launch of a new war in the region. Within this framework, Saudi Arabia also warned that, in the event of a U.S. attack on Iran, it would not permit the use of its airspace to support such operations.
Despite this stance, and in line with the logic of retaliation and disruption, Saudi Arabia, along with other Gulf monarchies, became a target of Iranian attacks. In addition to military installations hosting U.S. forces and the American embassy in Riyadh, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) targeted critical energy infrastructure, striking directly at the core of the Saudi economy.
Under these conditions, Riyadh decided to reassess its Iran policy. After formally condemning Iran, it granted the United States access to its air and other military facilities, expelled Iranian diplomats, and declared that any further Iranian strikes on its territory would be met with counterattacks. At the same time, the Kingdom appears to be advocating for the continuation of military operations until the Iranian threat is fully neutralized.
The recent Iranian attack on a Saudi military base hosting U.S. troops confirms the ongoing escalation and highlights the weakening of deterrence mechanisms, despite Riyadh’s explicit warnings.
To fully understand Saudi Arabia’s current strategy, it must be viewed within the broader context of its long-standing rivalry with Iran. This rivalry has primarily manifested through proxy conflicts across multiple arenas, including Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. Among these, Yemen has been a central battleground, often described as the “soft underbelly” of Saudi security.
Iran’s support for the Ansar Allah (Houthi) movement, along with its role in the group’s capture of the capital Sana’a and most of western Yemen, led to Saudi Arabia’s direct military intervention in the country’s civil war. This involvement imposed high economic and strategic costs on the Kingdom, largely due to repeated missile and drone attacks by the Houthis targeting oil facilities and other critical infrastructure on Saudi soil.
The normalization of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023, mediated by China, ushered in a period of relative de-escalation. During this phase, the threat posed by the Houthis declined significantly, while Saudi Arabia also moved toward rapprochement with the Assad regime in Syria, despite its close ties with Iran. At the same time, Riyadh shifted its focus toward its rivalry with the United Arab Emirates and sought to manage the emerging Israeli dominance in the Middle East following the outbreak of the Gaza war. Most importantly, under the de facto leadership of Mohammed bin Salman, the Kingdom prioritized the implementation of the ambitious “Vision 2030” development plan.
However, the ongoing conflict and Iranian retaliatory actions are now disrupting this balancing strategy, reintroducing acute security dilemmas into Saudi-Iranian relations.
At present, Saudi strategy is shifting, from cautious neutrality toward the possibility of direct military engagement. This shift can be explained by three main factors.
First, Saudi Arabia seeks to consolidate its position as a hegemonic regional power and as the leading force of the Sunni world. In pursuit of this objective, it has increasingly adopted power-projection strategies aimed at reshaping the regional security architecture and balance of power. Recent examples include the use of hard power in Yemen last December to weaken forces linked to the United Arab Emirates, the signing of a strategic defense agreement with Pakistan, and the expansion of Saudi influence in countries such as Syria, Sudan, Egypt, Somalia, and Libya. Iranian strikes directly undermine the credibility of this strategy, thereby creating an urgent need to restore deterrence.
Second, Saudi Arabia has a more advantageous strategic position compared to other Gulf states in terms of energy policy. While other monarchies rely almost entirely on the Strait of Hormuz—which remains effectively closed—Saudi Arabia possesses alternative infrastructure, most notably the East–West pipeline. This pipeline bypasses both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the latter of which remains under constant threat from pro-Iranian Houthi forces. With the capacity to transport up to 7 million barrels of oil per day, this infrastructure provides the Kingdom with strategic flexibility.
Third, the Saudi leadership appears to be reassessing its hierarchy of threats, increasingly viewing Iran as the primary strategic obstacle to achieving its long-term objectives—even more critical than Israel. The expectation that normalization would serve as a deterrent against Iranian aggression has not materialized. Thus, there is growing support for a strategy aimed at substantially weakening Iran, if not precipitating the collapse of the Iranian regime.
Overall, the ongoing conflict in the Middle East is reshaping the regional system and the balance of power. Saudi Arabia, which had shown signs of distancing itself from the United States—particularly during the presidency of Joe Biden—now appears to be realigning with the American camp. At the same time, a convergence with the United Arab Emirates is emerging, bridging a rift that had come close to open confrontation. Meanwhile, the impact of the conflict on Saudi-Israeli relations remains uncertain.
In conclusion, Saudi Arabia appears to be gradually abandoning the balancing strategy it pursued in recent years and shifting toward a more assertive and potentially confrontational approach toward Iran. This evolution is likely to have far-reaching implications, not only for bilateral relations but also for the broader configuration of regional order in the Middle East in the years to come.
